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JUST DO IT 
GIRARDEAU A. SPANN* 
INTRODUCTION 
Racial injustice has always been a problem in the United States.  The most 
salient victims of the Nation’s discrimination against racial minorities have in-
cluded indigenous Indians,1 Chinese immigrants,2 Japanese-American citizens,3 
Latinos,4 and of course blacks.5  But as the current war on terrorism illustrates, 
under the right conditions, almost any racial group can come within the scope of 
America’s discriminatory focus.6  It is common to suppose that that there is a 
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 1. For a description of the ways in which we appropriated land from, and decimated the popula-
tions of, indigenous Indians, see LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 508-09 
(2d ed. 1985); see generally, DEE BROWN, BURY MY HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE: AN INDIAN 
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WEST (1970); PETER MATTHIESSEN, IN THE SPIRIT OF CRAZY HORSE: 
THE STORY OF LEONARD PELTIER AND THE FBI’S WAR ON THE AMERICAN INDIAN MOVEMENT 
(1980); MARI SANDOZ, CRAZY HORSE: THE STRANGE MAN OF THE OGLALAS (1942). 
 2. For a description of the manner in which xenophobic racial prejudices caused us to enact the 
Chinese Exclusion laws see FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 509-10. 
 3. The World War II exclusion order that led to the internment of Japanese-American citizens 
was upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); see 
also id. at 239-41 (Murphy, J., dissenting, discussing racial prejudice and internment of Japanese-
Americans but not German- or Italian-Americans); FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 672. 
 4. One way we have expressed our discriminatory impulses against Spanish-speaking racial mi-
norities is through the adoption of English language laws.  See, e.g., Arizonans for Official English v. 
Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997) (vacating as moot a decision concerning the constitutionality of an Arizona 
law making English the official language of the State). 
 5. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857) (protecting the institution 
of slavery and holding that blacks could not be citizens within the meaning of the United States Consti-
tution); see also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding separate-but-equal racial segrega-
tion); cf. id. at 559 (opinion of Harlan, J., dissenting, describing blacks as inferior). 
 6. Legal commentators have noted the striking similarities that exist between the wartime deten-
tion of Japanese-Americans that was upheld in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), and the 
summary detentions of people of Middle Eastern ethnicity now authorized under executive orders, ad-
ministrative agency regulations, and the USA PATRIOT Act in our post-September 11, 2001 war on 
terrorism.  See, e.g., Liam Braber, Comment, Korematsu’s Ghost: A Post-September 11th Analysis of 
Race and National Security, 47 VIL. L. REV. 753 (2002); Developments, Plight of the Tempest-Tost: In-
definite Detention of Deportable Aliens, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1915, 1930-39 (2002); Jerry Kang, Thinking 
Through Internment: 12/7 And 9/11, 9 ASIAN L.J. 195, 197-200 (2002); Harold Hong Koh, The Spirit of 
the Laws, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 23, 33-39 (2002); Lori Sachs, Comment, September 11, 2001: The Consti-
tution During Crisis: A New Perspective, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1715, 1728-43 (2002); Huong Vu, 
Note, Us Against Them: The Path to National Security is Paved by Racism, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 661, 661-
64, 691-93 (2002); Michael J. Whidden, Note, Unequal Justice: Arabs in America and United States Anti-
terrorism Legislation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2825, 2825-30, 2836-41 (2002). For a recent news story de-
scribing summary detentions of “material witnesses” in the war on terrorism see Steve Fainaru & 
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difference between the progressive and the conservative ends of the political 
spectrum concerning the issue of race.  However, those commonly accepted dif-
ferences pale in comparison to the overriding similarity that exists between pro-
gressives and conservatives.  Both progressives and conservatives are liberals in 
the classical sense of the term.  And the tenets of liberalism seem destined to 
preclude us from ever achieving any meaningful level of racial equality in the 
United States. 
I 
PROGRESSIVE AND CONSERVATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON RACE 
Progressives and conservatives do have different normative perspectives on 
the issue of race.  In describing these divergent perspectives, I have chosen to 
describe idealized conceptions of both.  Like the “reasonable person” used as 
the model of due care in torts, my “progressives” and “conservatives” are theo-
retical abstractions rather than card-carrying members of any actual schools of 
thought.  This has allowed me to avoid the potentially controversial exercise of 
identifying particular judges and commentators to illustrate the various claims 
that I am making.  Nevertheless, I have attempted to describe my hypothetical 
progressives and conservatives in a manner that will make them seem both co-
herent and familiar. 
Progressives are more likely than conservatives to view the culture’s en-
dorsement of the equality principle as a substantive commitment, and they are 
less likely to view it as having only rhetorical content.  For that reason, pro-
gressives are more likely than conservatives to feel discomfort when witnessing 
the social, political and economic disadvantages that racial minorities experi-
ence in contemporary American culture.  As a result, progressives are more 
likely than conservatives to identify discrimination against racial minorities as a 
problem that warrants remedial attention.  Because progressives define the 
sphere of permissible public action in terms that are relatively broad, pro-
gressives tend to favor policies that seek to alter the racial status quo through 
legal intervention.  Progressives are correspondingly less likely to believe that 
race relations issues can be resolved through deference to private preferences 
or market ordering.  In addition, progressives are likely to infer from the Na-
tion’s long history of discrimination, and its present maldistribution of re-
sources, that race is a culturally significant category.  This causes progressives to 
be skeptical of purported colorblind or race-neutral approaches to the issue of 
race, and more receptive than conservatives to race-conscious affirmative action 
remedies for the problem of racial injustice.  Progressives are also more likely 
to value diversity and to accept the relativity inherent in the concept of multi-
culturalism.  As a result, progressives tend to believe that it is legitimate to rec-
ognize the existence of group rights as well as individual rights in our increas-
 
Margot Williams, Material Witness Law Has Many in Limbo: Nearly Half Held in War On Terror Ha-
ven’t Testified, WASH. POST, Nov 24, 2002, at A1. 
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ingly multicultural society.  This gives progressives a greater fondness for civic 
republican values than for interest group pluralism as the aspirational objective 
of governance. 
Conservatives are less likely than progressives to view the culture’s en-
dorsement of the equality principle as a substantive commitment and are more 
likely to view it as having only rhetorical content.  For that reason, conserva-
tives are less likely than progressives to feel discomfort when witnessing the so-
cial, political, and economic disadvantages that racial minorities experience in 
contemporary American culture.  As a result, conservatives are less likely than 
progressives to identify discrimination against racial minorities as a problem 
that warrants remedial attention.  Because conservatives define the sphere of 
permissible public action in terms that are relatively narrow, conservatives tend 
to oppose policies that seek to alter the racial status quo through legal interven-
tion.  Conservatives are more likely to believe that race relations issues should 
be resolved through deference to private preferences and efficient market or-
dering. In fact, conservatives fear that the more serious threat to racial equality 
in contemporary American culture is posed by the danger of government inter-
ference with market ordering in a way that produces inefficient reverse dis-
crimination.  In addition, conservatives resist the suggestion that either the Na-
tion’s history of racial discrimination, or its present distribution of resources, 
makes race a culturally significant category.  Conservatives tend to believe that 
the history of discrimination has little application to current race relations be-
cause that history has been largely superseded by the gains of the civil rights 
movement.  Moreover, conservatives tend to believe that the present distribu-
tion of resources reflects merit and relative ability rather than any lingering 
commitment to past discrimination.  As a result, conservatives are likely to fa-
vor only colorblind or race-neutral responses to any redistributive needs that 
might exist because of market failures in allocating resources.  Conservatives 
also tend to oppose race-conscious affirmative action because it simply revives 
the evils of prior racial discrimination and diverts us from the desirable goal of 
prospective racial equality.  Conservatives are also less likely to value diversity 
or to accept the relativity inherent in multiculturalism.  As a result, conserva-
tives tend to favor the recognition of individual rights but not group rights in a 
society that should be conceptualized as unitary rather than multicultural.  This 
gives conservatives a greater fondness for the interest group pluralism they be-
lieve to be the essence of democracy than for communitarian civic republi-
canism as the aspirational objective of governance. 
The Nation’s current race-relations policy can be understood as a com-
promise between these progressive and conservative perspectives on race.  Pro-
gressives have been successful in identifying race and its correlation with social, 
political and economic disadvantage as a problem that warrants remedial public 
intervention.  Conservatives have been successful in establishing that any public 
intervention that does occur must be race-neutral in nature, so that such inter-
vention does not itself constitute reverse racial discrimination against whites.  
Accordingly, the current law as developed by the Supreme Court and accepted 
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by contemporary American culture is that race-conscious affirmative action is 
largely unconstitutional, but that race-neutral redistributive measures that hap-
pen to include racial minorities among the class of beneficiaries are constitu-
tionally permissible.7  That compromise is arguably consistent with the aspi-
rational goals of both pluralist and civic republican political theories, and it may 
signify that the culture is on its way to developing a durable solution to the 
problem of racial injustice.  However, the present racial compromise is also sub-
ject to a less optimistic interpretation. 
II 
LIBERALISM 
The reason that American culture has historically been unable to solve the 
problem of racial injustice is that American culture is committed to the political 
philosophy of liberalism.8  Both progressives and conservatives share this com-
mitment to such a degree that it overshadows the relatively insignificant differ-
ences that exist in their perspectives on race.  Three important features of liber-
alism make it ill-suited to the pursuit of racial justice in the United States. 
 
 7. Although the Supreme Court applies deferential rational basis review to most governmental 
classifications, see New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 592-94 (1979) (applying 
rational basis review to non-suspect classifications), the Court applies demanding strict scrutiny to ra-
cial classifications, even if those classifications are part of a benign affirmative action program. See 
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 269 (2003) (applying strict scrutiny to racial affirmative action); Grut-
ter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 324-28 (2003) (same); Adarand Constructors v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 223-27 
(1995) (same); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507-08 (1989) (same); see also Ada-
rand, 515 U.S. at 237-38 (favoring race-neutral over race-based affirmative action); Croson, 488 U.S. at 
509-10 (same). The Court almost always invalidates racial affirmative action under the strict scrutiny 
standard of review. See, e.g., Gratz, 539 U.S. at 274-76 (invalidating affirmative action program used by 
University of Michigan undergraduate college); Croson, 488 U.S. at 498-509 (invalidating municipal af-
firmative action program for construction contractors); cf. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 239 (reversing lower 
court decisions upholding federal affirmative action program for construction contractors after inter-
mediate scrutiny, and remanding for application of strict scrutiny); see also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 
U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment, arguing that strict scrutiny is “strict in 
theory, but fatal in fact”); see generally GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, 
156-59, 164-68 (2000) (discussing statistical outcomes in affirmative action cases, and discussing doc-
trinal effect of applying strict scrutiny).  In one recent case, however, a racial affirmative action pro-
gram was upheld after strict scrutiny.  See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343 (upholding affirmative action pro-
gram used by University of Michigan law school); see also Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237 (“we wish to dispel 
the notion that strict scrutiny is ‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact,’” quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 519 
(Marshall, J., concurring in judgment)).  The limited significance of the Grutter decision, upholding the 
University of Michigan law school affirmative action program, is discussed in Girardeau A. Spann, The 
Dark Side of Grutter, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 179 (2004). 
 8. For general accounts of liberalism see RONALD DWORKIN, Liberalism, in A MATTER OF 
PRINCIPLE 181-213 (1985); MICHAEL J. GERHARDT ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: ARGUMENTS 
AND PERSPECTIVES  245-50 (2d ed. 2000); AMY GUTMANN, LIBERAL EQUALITY 1-47 (1980); Will 
Kymlicka, Liberalism, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY 483-85 (Ted Honderich ed., 
1995); H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE MORAL TRADITION OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 1-11, 
37-47 (1993); Mark Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral 
Principles, HARV. L. REV. 781, 781-86 (1983); MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL 
ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 4-10, 21-23, 109, 269-76, 313 (1988). 
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First, classical liberalism places a high value on individual liberty.9  An im-
portant component of individual liberty is the right to develop autonomous sys-
tems of personal beliefs and associational preferences that the culture must 
honor rather than override.  However, both progressives and conservatives are 
part of a culture whose shared beliefs and associational preferences are prem-
ised on a view of racial minorities as inferior to whites.  As a result, remedies 
for racial injustice that would disregard those beliefs and preferences are out of 
bounds in a liberal culture, even if those are the only remedies that promise to 
be effective.10 
Second, the commitment to individual liberty forces liberals to believe that 
disputes about the allocation of resources in society can be satisfactorily re-
solved through the invocation of neutral allocation principles.11  But the “neu-
trality” of those principles will necessarily reflect the normative preferences of 
the dominant culture.  In a multicultural society, in which not only resource dis-
tribution is unequal but shared perspectives and normative values are absent, 
what passes for liberal neutrality is likely to consist of nothing more than a pa-
rochial refusal by those possessing power to recognize the legitimacy of claims 
for racial justice asserted by those who lack power.  As a result, the concept of 
neutrality tends to be viewed as discriminatory rather than neutral by the racial 
minorities who feel victimized by those principles, and that prevents the con-
cept of neutrality from satisfactorily serving the legitimating function that it is 
designed to serve.12 
Third, liberalism is rooted in Enlightenment conceptions of reason.13  Liber-
alism is committed to the belief that syllogistic rational analysis provides a reli-
able method for developing fair and equitable solutions to even our most in-
tractable social problems.  In recent years, however, critical race theory has 
argued that this commitment to reason often masks the ways in which legal and 
cultural norms are racially oppressive.14  The preoccupation with reason causes 
the culture to treat socially constructed values as if they were absolute and ob-
jective rather than parochial and contingent.  Critical race theory has sought to 
expose the racial tilt often embedded in current institutional arrangements and 
to escape the epistemological constraints of liberalism by emphasizing alterna-
tive conceptual methodologies, including multiculturalism, literary narrative, 
and identity politics.15  However, the legitimacy of those efforts has met with lib-
 
 9. See POWELL, supra note 8 at 6, n.16 (discussing individual autonomy). 
 10. Examples of potentially effective remedies that are impermissibly illiberal are discussed in Part 
III, below. 
 11. See TUSHNET, supra note 8, at 23-24, 46. 
 12. For a discussion of the concept of legitimation as a technique for suppressing minority dissent 
see GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREME COURT & MINORITIES IN 
CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 150-60 (1993). 
 13. See POWELL, supra note 8 at 6, n.16 (discussing the Enlightenment attitude toward reason). 
 14. See, eg., MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., Introduction in WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE 
THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3-7 (1993). 
 15. See, eg., Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Neutrality, The Race Question, and the 1991 Civil Rights 
Act: The “Impossibility” of Permanent Reform, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 965, 971-83 (1993); see generally 
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eral resistance, precisely because those alternatives are thought to be inconsis-
tent with the tenets of Western Enlightenment thought.16 
III 
PROPORTIONALITY 
It turns out that things can be done to address the problem of racial injustice 
in the United States.  They range in scope from mild ameliorative measures to 
more comprehensive conceptual solutions.  But the more effective a solution is 
likely to be, the more offensive it is likely to be to liberal conceptions of legiti-
macy.  At the mild end of the spectrum, the culture can retain its basic aspira-
tional values, but abandon what I term the “silly arguments” that have pre-
vented it from applying those values in a way that promotes racial justice.  I am 
referring to arguments such as the Supreme Court’s assertion in its affirmative 
action cases that legal remedies cannot properly be used to eliminate the effects 
of general “societal discrimination,”17 and Justice O’Connor’s argument in City 
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,18  that stark racial disparities are not enough to 
permit the Court to determine things like whether there has been a history of 
racial discrimination in Richmond, Virginia.19 
A more ambitious alternative would be for the culture to de-emphasize the 
liberal conception of individual rights, which seems ironically to have been a 
major cause of racial oppression.20  If the culture were able to surmount the ob-
stacle of “rights,” more interesting remedial measures would become available. 
For example, the culture could adopt meaningful antidiscrimination laws that 
actually addressed the problem of racial segregation in schools or residential 
neighborhoods.21  It could permit individuals to attend particular schools or live 
 
MICHAEL J. GERHARDT ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: ARGUMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES  375-
421 (2d ed. 2000) (describing critical race theory). 
 16. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL 
ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW 5-12 (1997) (describing ways in which critical race theory is 
inconsistent with Western conceptions of reason). 
 17. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 496-98 (1989); see also Shaw v. Hunt, 
517 U.S. 899, 909-10 (1996) (rejecting general societal discrimination); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ. 
476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (opinion of Powell, J.) (same); see generally SPANN, supra note 7, at 168-69 
(2000) (discussing general societal discrimination). 
 18. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
 19. See id. at 498-508 (1989) (discussing inadequacy of statistical evidence to establish history of 
discrimination in Richmond, Virginia construction trades). 
 20. One of the arguments that the Supreme Court has invoked as a reason to invalidate racial af-
firmative action programs is that those programs interfere with the individual rights of the whites who 
are burdened by affirmative action.  See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 322 (2003), citing Re-
gents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 256, 310 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.); Wygant v. Jackson 
Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 283-84 (1986) (considering burden on innocent whites in equal protection 
context); cf. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979) (considering burden 
on innocent whites in Title VII context). 
 21. Urban racial segregation continues to be extensive in both residential and educational contexts. 
See DOUGLAS MASSEY & NANCY DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE 
MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993) (discussing concept of urban residential “hypersegregation” in 
book entitled “AMERICAN APARTHEID”); GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 471-
74 (4th ed. 2001) (discussing stark statistics involving racial segregation in public schools). 
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in particular neighborhoods only when doing so was consistent with the racial 
balance that the culture desired.  However, that option would become available 
only if the culture were willing to override the private beliefs and associational 
preferences that have caused and perpetuated the culture’s present forms of ra-
cial segregation.  The remedy of reparations for the legacy of slavery would be 
an even more radical solution.22  It would not only provide some measure of 
compensation for victims of past racial injustice, but it could potentially prompt 
the culture to favor present racial justice by forcing it to internalize the costs of 
its own racial attitudes. 
The solution likely to be most effective in promoting racial justice in the 
United States is one that insists on racial proportionality in the allocation of all 
significant societal resources.  By assuming unlawful discrimination co-exists 
with a racially disproportionate allocation of resources, this proportionality so-
lution would train the culture to view racial equality as the norm rather than the 
exception.  The liberal constraints of American culture likely make that solu-
tion politically and legally unavailable.  But that was also true of slavery.23  If the 
culture so desired, it could reformulate its political and legal constraints to per-
mit it to pursue the strategy of proportionality. 
We live in a culture characterized by significant amounts of persistent racial 
injustice.  Nothing illustrates that more clearly than the under-representation of 
racial minorities in the allocation of nearly all important societal resourcesan 
allocation that has caused us to have a permanent racial underclass.24  It is ap-
parently not within our power to transcend the racial attitudes that have led us 
 
 22. For the basic arguments asserted by proponents of reparations see RANDALL ROBINSON, THE 
DEBT: WHAT AMERICA OWES TO BLACKS (2000).  For additional arguments see Adrienne D. Davis, 
The Case for United States Reparations to African Americans (2000), at http://www.unc.edu/~danielg/ 
seminar_on_law/feb27_davis.doc. 
 23. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857) (protecting the institution 
of slavery and holding that blacks could not be citizens within the meaning of the United States Consti-
tution, thereby precluding possibility of political solutions and ultimately leading to the Civil War); see 
also STONE ET AL., supra note 21, at 429-31(discussing way in which Dred Scott precluded further po-
litical compromise on issue of slavery). 
 24. Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion in Gratz v. Bollinger cites statistical data documenting the 
disadvantages that racial minorities continue to suffer in many areas of American life, including 
employment, poverty, health care, education, housing, and consumer transactions.  See Gratz v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 298-301 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  For additional data documenting 
racial disparities in the allocation of significant societal resources see Stephen Brobeck, Black 
American Personal Wealth: Current Status (2002), at http://www.americasaves.org/back_page/ 
BlackWealthReport082902.doc (discussing personal wealth); Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dept. of 
Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States1996, 413 (Table 644) (Unemployed 
WorkersSummary: 1980 to 1995); Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Statistical Abstract 
of the United States1993, 477 (Table 753) (families living below poverty level); id. at 93 (Table 127) 
(Infant Mortality Rates, by Race); DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE 
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 4-5, 8 (1999) (treatment by criminal justice system); GERALD 
DAVID JAYNES & ROBIN M. WILLIAMS EDS., A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS AND AMERICAN 
SOCIETY, 274, 279 (1989) (discussing poverty rates); id. at 415, 419 (homicide rates); Beverly I. Moran 
& William Whitford, A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue Code, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 751, 751-55 
(1996) (racially disparate treatment in Internal Revenue Code); Lu-in Wang, Symposium, “Suitable 
Targets”? Parallels and Connections between “Hate” Crimes and “Driving While Black,” 6 MICH. J. 
RACE & L. 209 (2001) (driving while black); see also Paul Butler, (Color) Blind Faith: The Tragedy of 
Race, Crime and the Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1270, 1286 (1998) (book review) (walking while black). 
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to that maldistribution of resources.  But it is within our power to alter the dis-
tribution itself. Imagine what a culture would look like in which all important 
resources were allocated in a racially proportional manner.  Doctors, lawyers, 
members of Congress, corporate executives, college students, movie heroes, 
movie villains, professional basketball players, custodial workers, and past 
Presidents of the United States would all reflect the racial composition of the 
Nation. Social roles would no longer be viewed even tacitly as stereotypical 
white roles, or black roles, or roles associated with other racial minority groups. 
The baseline assumptions of the culture would change.  It would become a 
noteworthy event when the United States Senate ended up being all white, 
rather than being noteworthy when a single black was elected to the Senate.25  
Our expectation would be to see racial proportionality everywhere we looked, 
rather than to see white dominance everywhere we looked.  We would think 
that something was wrong when whites possessed too much wealth or too much 
power, rather than viewing white power as evidence that everything was work-
ing according to plan.  In short, we would come to assume that racial equality 
was the norm rather than the aberration.  That such racial proportionality 
seems utopian simply illustrates how far we have diverged from the principle of 
racial equality that we formally espouse. 
I anticipate two types of objections to my proportionality suggestionthe 
first conceptual, the second practical.  The conceptual objections relate to ab-
stract concerns about issues such as merit, seniority, and upsetting reliance on 
settled expectations.  Those are the liberal objections that are typically offered 
to defeat disfavored redistributive programs, and they would certainly be of-
fered as reasons to reject an extensive redistributive program whose goal was 
the racially proportional allocation of significant societal resources.  However, 
those objections have always struck me as largely inapposite.  Concerns about 
seniority and protecting settled expectations seem parasitic to the overriding 
concern about merit, and the concern about merit seems simply to be a red her-
ring.  If in fact differences in individual merit correlate with racesomething 
that I would not lightly concedeit is only because racial discrimination oper-
ates somewhere in the cultural institutions that produce those racially corre-
lated differences.  If the training we provide to acquire merit, and the devices 
that we use to measure merit, operated in a racially nondiscriminatory manner, 
we would no longer expect to see racially correlated differences in the distribu-
tion of merit throughout the culture.  We would continue to see those racially 
correlated differences only if racial minorities were somehow inherently inferior 
to whites in their ability to take advantage of the training and opportunities that 
the culture made available to them.  That inherent inferiority assumption is not 
 
 25. Presentlyand typicallythe United States Senate contains no black members. There have 
been only two black members of the Senate since Reconstruction. Edward Brooke, a Republican from 
Massachusetts, served from 1976-79, and Carol Moseley-Braun, a democrat from Illinois, served from 
1993-99. See Narrative of the Fight for Freedom, Enfranchisement, and the Seating of the First Blacks in 
Congress, at http://www.house.gov/ebjohnson/cbchistoryprerevels.htm. 
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one I am prepared to accept.  However, I fear it may be the assumption driving 
the longstanding inability of liberal American culture to achieve racial justice.26 
The practical objections to a racially proportional reallocation of resources 
relate to concrete concerns about issues such as identifying the racial minority 
groups that count for proportionality purposes, identifying the societal re-
sources significant enough to require proportional allocation, and developing 
transitional strategies to achieve proportional representation in social roles for 
which minorities presently lack the requisite training.  Certain legal issues 
would also have to be resolved concerning the source, nature, and enforcement 
of the proportionality requirement, and the roles the Supreme Court and the 
representative branches would each play with respect to proportionality. It is, of 
course, possible to work out solutions for the practical problems.  Relying on 
the pluralist political process to resolve most of those problems would be pref-
erable to relying on the Supreme Court because the representative branches 
have a better historical record than the Court in protecting racial minority in-
terests.27  For that reason, the operative legal source of the proportionality re-
quirement might be more effective if it were rooted in statutes and ad-
ministrative regulations than if it were rooted the Constitution.  However, 
judicial enforcement of a constitutional provision requiring racial proportional-
ity might have symbolic importance in reminding the culture that it had come to 
favor a commitment to the principle of operative, rather than rhetorical, racial 
equality.  We would not even have to amend the Constitution to discover such a 
constitutional provision.  We could simply call it the Equal Protection Clause.28 
Obviously, none of those practical problems could be overcome unless the 
culture were first committed to the idea of racial proportionality.  But if it were, 
the practical problems would become merely matters of detail.  To the extent 
that one is inclined to believe that the culture could never overcome the practi-
cal obstacles to a racially determined allocation of significant societal resources, 
history suggests that concern is unfounded.  As a de facto matter, societal re-
sources have traditionally been allocated in a racially determined way.  They 
have traditionally been allocated to whites.29  We should simply change the par-
ticular races to which some of those resources will be directed in the future.  To 
the extent one is inclined to argue that the Supreme Court would never tolerate 
the explicitly racial allocation of resources that proportionality demands, that 
argument is certainly sound regarding the present Supreme Court.30  However, a 
Supreme Court that existed in a culture in which racial proportionality had be-
come an accepted political priority would necessarily be a very different Court. 
 
 26. See Girardeau A. Spann, Affirmative Action and Discrimination, 39 HOW. L.J. 1, 90-94 (discuss-
ing the inherent inferiority assumption). 
 27. See generally SPANN, supra note 17 (discussing Supreme Court oppression of racial minorities). 
 28. See U.S. CONST. Amend XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 29. See supra note 24 (citing statistics concerning racially disparate allocation of desirable resources 
to whites). 
 30. See generally SPANN, supra note 17 (discussing Supreme Court oppression of racial minorities). 
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The idea of proportionality that I am advocating should not be confused 
with mere affirmative action.  What I have in mind is quite different.  The con-
cept of affirmative action has been somewhat acceptable to liberal American 
culture precisely because it refuses to demand the one concession I view as cru-
cial to the pursuit of meaningful racial justice.  Affirmative action is an out-
growth of the prevailing liberal epistemology about race.  It emanates from the 
belief that race is a social category whose relevance can be marginalized, and 
whose invidious influence can be contained by using remedial measures that 
make incremental changes to the status quo.  As a result, affirmative action of-
fers the hope of enticing a few, largely middle-class, minorities into positions of 
social, political or economic comfort.  It does not, however, do anything to 
eliminate the permanent racial underclass that the culture perpetually dis-
regards.31 
My proportionality proposal emanates from the belief that race has always 
been one of the few things that really matter in America.  As a result, the in-
fluence of race can never be contained, and mere incremental change serves 
primarily to distract us from the fact that we systematically discount the inter-
ests of our racial underclass.  Proportionality seeks to change both the baseline 
concerning acceptable distributions of resources and the baseline concerning 
the social significance we attach to race.  There may be cultures in which the 
concept of colorblind race neutrality is a coherent concept and in which modest 
redistribution can be meaningful in the quest for racial justice.  But liberal 
American culture has never been one of those cultures.  Because of its prevail-
ing attitudes about racial inferiority and because of the protection that liberal-
ism demands that we extend to those attitudes, American culture has always 
been incapable of achieving a meaningful level of racial equality.  The best it 
can hope to do is approximate the distribution of resources that would exist in a 
culture that had achieved a meaningful level of racial equality.  Perhaps in time 
American culture could actually evolve into that hypothetical culture.  But that, 
of course, would require the culture to take the meaningful first step of actually 
desiring such an outcome. 
CONCLUSION 
So, things look pretty bleak.  The United States is a liberal culture.  And the 
tenets of liberalism preclude the meaningful pursuit of racial justice in a culture 
in which the only effective remedies for racial injustice entail overriding the pri-
vate beliefs and associational preferences that liberalism protects.  Because the 
appeal of liberalism continues to be strong enough to encompass both the pro-
gressive and conservative ends of the political spectrum, it appears that racial 
injustice will persist in the United States regardless of who is in power.  I am not 
happy about that observation, although I am becoming increasingly resigned to 
it.  We could go a long way toward solving the problem of racial injustice by 
 
 31. See ROBINSON, supra note 22, at 8-9 (discussing failure of affirmative action to address prob-
lems of black underclass). 
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simply insisting on a proportional allocation of societal resources.  True, that 
would upset the sense of entitlement that is strongly felt by many members of 
the dominant white culture.  But if we cared about racial justice, we would not 
let that stand in our way.  We would just do it. 
 
